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Knox: Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure

FIXING THE CEC SUBMISSIONS
PROCEDURE: ARE THE 2012
REVISIONS UP TO THE TASK?
JOHN H. KNOX *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The citizen submissions procedure of the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) celebrates its
twentieth birthday this year. After a promising childhood, the procedure
has had a stormy adolescence, vexed by accusations of ineffectiveness,
bias, and delay. In 2012, the CEC adopted revisions to the procedure that
promise to improve its timeliness, but do little or nothing to address its
other problems. As the procedure enters its twenties, settled maturity is
still a distant prospect.
Created in 1993 by the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), 1 a tri-national agreement
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the submissions
procedure allows any individual or group in one of the three Parties to
file a complaint with the CEC alleging that a Party is failing to enforce
its domestic environmental laws. If the submission meets certain
admissibility requirements, it can lead to a detailed investigative report,
called a “factual record.” 2
As Section II of this Article describes, the first two decades of the
*

Henry C. Lauerman Professor of International Law, Wake Forest University. I participated in the
negotiation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) as an
attorney-adviser at the Department of State in the early 1990s. After I joined academia, I served as
the chair of the U.S. National Advisory Committee on the NAAEC between 1999 and 2005. This
Article reflects my personal views, not those of the U.S. government or the National Advisory
Committee. I am grateful to Paul Kibel for his comments on a draft of the Article.
1
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 8-14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
2
Id. arts. 14, 15.
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CEC submissions procedure have seen real achievements, but they have
also given rise to growing controversies. Scholars and environmental
advocates have increasingly criticized the procedure on three grounds:
(a) it is far too slow, (b) the Parties interfere with it too often, and (c) the
CEC does not follow-up factual records to determine whether they have
led to real improvements.
The fundamental problem underlying all of these criticisms is that
the procedure is overseen by the same Parties against which the
submissions are directed. The Parties control key decision points,
including whether to authorize an investigation and whether to make
public any resulting report, 3 and they have found it difficult to resist the
temptation to use their power over the submissions process to delay or
limit reports that might criticize their environmental policies. Their
efforts to protect themselves from embarrassment have often led to
counter-efforts by CEC advisory bodies and environmental groups to
defend the independence and effectiveness of the procedure. 4
As Part III explains, the most recent round in this recurring struggle
began in 2011, when the NAAEC Parties announced that they planned to
adopt revisions to the procedure’s Guidelines. Outside observers saw the
revision process as an opportunity to address long-standing problems, but
they also feared that the Parties could use the revisions to weaken the
procedure further. In early 2012, a governmental task force proposed
revisions that seemed to confirm these concerns. 5 As a result, CEC
advisory bodies and others strongly objected to many of the suggested
amendments to the Guidelines. 6 The objections appear to have had some
3

Id. art. 15(2), (7).
See John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons
from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505, 525-26 (2012).
5
Council-Directed Task Force on SEM Modernization, Proposed Changes to the Guidelines
for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Draft Negotiating Text (Mar. 27, 2012) (draft), available
at
www.cec.org/Storage/136/16141_Proposed_SEM_Guideline_Changes_and_MemoDraft_for_Comments_16April12_en.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Proposed Changes].
6
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, SEM Task Force Proposals for Changes to the Guidelines
for Submission on Enforcement Matters (SEM), Advice to Council No 12-01, CEC Doc. J/1201/ADV/Final (May 23, 2012), available at www.cec.org/Storage/137/16238_JPAC_Advice_12-01Final-en.pdf [hereinafter Advice to Council 12-01]; Joint Letter from U.S. Nat’l Advisory Comm. &
U.S. Governmental Advisory Comm. to U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 16, 2012), available at
www.epa.gov/ocempage/gac/pdf/2012/2012_0516_joint_nac_gac_advice_letter.pdf
[hereinafter
Joint Advisory Letter]. The National Advisory Committee and the Governmental Advisory
Committee are advisory committees created by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the
NAAEC, which provides that each Party may convene such committees, comprising members of the
public and representatives of sub-federal governments, respectively, to advise it on the
implementation and further elaboration of the NAAEC. NAAEC, supra note 1, arts. 17, 18. Canada
and Mexico do not currently have such committees.
4
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effect: the final version of the Guidelines adopted by the NAAEC Parties
in July 2012 drops or softens the more controversial proposals. 7
Moreover, the revisions set new deadlines that, if followed, would
greatly shorten the time the procedure takes to process submissions.
However, the revised Guidelines still impose new restrictions on the
submissions procedure, and they continue to ignore the need for effective
follow-up to factual records.
Part IV concludes by underlining that while the CEC submissions
procedure still offers a unique mechanism to draw attention to important
environmental issues that might otherwise be overlooked, its
shortcomings have sapped its attractiveness to potential submitters. The
adoption of stricter deadlines is a step in the right direction, but to restore
trust in the procedure, the CEC must do more. Specifically, it must
regularly meet the deadlines in practice, it should start following-up
factual records, and, most importantly, the Parties must resist the urge to
micromanage the process. Otherwise, criticisms and controversy will
continue to follow the procedure as it enters its third decade.
II.

THE CEC SUBMISSIONS PROCEDURE AND ITS DISCONTENTS

A.

THE CEC SUBMISSIONS PROCEDURE ON PAPER

The history and structure of the CEC and its submissions procedure
have been described many times. 8 The following summary highlights
only the main points.
Although the three North American governments negotiated the
NAAEC to address environmental concerns with the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the focus of the NAAEC is much
broader than trade-related environmental issues. It provides a platform
for environmental cooperation throughout North America. To that end, it
offers innovative avenues for public involvement, including the
submissions procedure that is the subject of this Article.
7

COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, SEM GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS ON
ENFORCEMENT MATTERS UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION
(July
11,
2012),
available
at
www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10838 [hereinafter SEM GUIDELINES].
8
See, e.g., JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE
FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1997); KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA, AND BEYOND (2004); JONATHAN GRAUBART, LEGALIZING
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE STRUGGLE TO GAIN SOCIAL CHANGE FROM NAFTA’S CITIZEN
PETITIONS (2008); GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREENING NAFTA].
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The NAAEC created a new international organization, the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, with three components: a
Council composed of the Parties’ environmental ministers or their
designees; a Secretariat of international civil servants headed by an
Executive Director; and a Joint Public Advisory Council (JPAC) made
up of fifteen citizens serving in their individual capacity, with five
citizens appointed by each Party. 9 The agreement gives each of the CEC
components specific mandates. The Council has broad authority to serve
as a forum for discussion of environmental matters, make
recommendations, approve the CEC program, and promote cooperation
between the Parties on environmental matters. 10 The JPAC provides
advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of the NAAEC. 11
The Secretariat primarily supports the Council in carrying out the CEC
work program, 12 but it also has independent functions.
Most importantly, the Secretariat administers the CEC citizen
submissions procedure, also known as the Submissions on Enforcement
Matters (SEM) process. 13 This procedure allows individuals and groups
to file complaints with the CEC that may result in an independent
investigation and publication of a “factual record.” However, the scope
of the complaints is limited: they may address only the alleged failure by
a Party to “effectively enforce its environmental law.”14
The focus on the failure of a Party to enforce domestic
environmental law may seem an odd approach for an international
agreement, but it resulted from the chief environmental criticism of
NAFTA at the time the NAAEC was negotiated. 15 By lowering barriers
to trade and investment among the three North American countries,
NAFTA allows—and even encourages—corporations to shift operations
to take advantage of the lowest costs of production they can find.
Environmentalists feared that countries would feel pressure to attract
corporations by lowering the costs of compliance with environmental
standards. The result would be a “race to the bottom,” in which the
Parties would compete to weaken their environmental laws. The
particular concern was with enforcement. NAFTA critics generally
accepted that, as written, Mexican environmental standards were
9

NAAEC, supra note 1, arts. 8(2), 9, 11, 16.
Id. art. 10(1).
11
Id. art. 16(4).
12
Id. art. 11(5).
13
Id. arts. 14, 15.
14
Id. art. 14(1).
15
See David L. Markell & John H. Knox, The Innovative North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 8, at 4-5, 8.
10
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comparable to those of its northern neighbors, but they correctly pointed
out that Mexico put far less resources into enforcement. They convinced
the U.S. government—and, through it, the other Parties—that a new
agreement was necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of domestic
environmental laws. 16
The NAAEC, negotiated as a side agreement to NAFTA, has
several provisions intended to encourage enforcement, including a
formal legal obligation imposed on each Party “to effectively enforce its
environmental laws and regulations,” and an intergovernmental disputeresolution mechanism that allows Parties to bring complaints against one
another based on an alleged “persistent pattern of failure . . . to
effectively enforce.” 17 The most important of these provisions establish a
new submissions procedure through which individuals and
nongovernmental organizations may seek an investigation of alleged
failures by any of the Parties to effectively enforce its laws.
Studies conducted since NAFTA entered into force have
undermined the belief that pollution havens cause a race to the bottom.
The costs of compliance with environmental standards are, in general,
not high enough to motivate corporations to shift their operations. 18
Nevertheless, the concern with effective enforcement of domestic
environmental standards remains. To ensure sustainable development, it
is not enough that laws purport to require environmental protection: they
must result in real changes in behavior. Developing countries, in
particular, may find it relatively easy to enact environmental laws, but
much more difficult to obtain compliance with the laws once enacted. In
this sense, then, the emphasis in the NAAEC on effective enforcement of
domestic laws has remained highly relevant, as has the success or failure
of the CEC submissions procedure in promoting such enforcement. 19
To be admissible, submissions on enforcement matters must meet
several requirements. For example, a submission must clearly identify
the person or organization making the complaint, and it must be filed by
a person or organization residing or established in the territory of a party
to the NAAEC. 20 If a submission clears these hurdles, the Secretariat
decides whether it merits a response from the Party concerned, in light of
four other factors: (a) whether the submission alleges harm to the person
or organization making the submission; (b) whether the submission
16

Id. at 8-9.
NAAEC, supra note 1, arts. 5(1), 22(1).
18
GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 31-33.
19
John H. Knox, The Neglected Lessons of the NAFTA Environmental Regime, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 391, 398 (2010).
20
NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(1).
17
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raises matters whose further study in the SEM process would advance
the goals of the NAAEC; (c) whether private remedies available under
the Party’s law have been pursued; and (d) whether the submission is
drawn exclusively from mass media reports. 21
In light of the Party’s response, the Secretariat decides whether a
full investigation is appropriate. 22 If the Secretariat decides an
investigation is warranted, it must request the Council’s permission to
proceed. 23
Only if the Council agrees, by a two-thirds vote, may the Secretariat
conduct an investigation and prepare a “factual record.”24 As its name
suggests, a factual record is not legally binding. In the view of the
Parties, the Secretariat is not even permitted to reach legal conclusions
about whether a Party has violated its obligation under the NAAEC to
effectively enforce its environmental laws, although nothing in the
NAAEC explicitly prohibits such statements. Finally, the Council
controls one last decision point: after the factual record is submitted by
the Secretariat, the Council decides, again by a two-thirds vote, whether
to make it publicly available. 25
B.

THE SUBMISSIONS PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE

The submissions procedure has been active throughout its history,
receiving an average of over four submissions a year since the first
submissions were filed in 1995, and a total of eighty submissions as of
March 2013. 26 Of that number, fifty survived the initial admissibility
decision and resulted in a request for a response by the government
concerned, and twenty-six of those resulted in a request by the
Secretariat for a factual record. Those twenty-six requests led to twentyone Council authorizations of factual records. 27 As of March 2013, the
21

Id. art. 14(2).
Id. art. 15(1).
23
Id.
24
Id. art. 15(2).
25
Id. art. 15(7).
26
All figures concerning CEC submissions are derived from information available at the
CEC Registry of Submissions. See Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=751&ContentID=&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID=156
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
27
The Council has declined to authorize only two Secretariat requests. See Comm'n for
Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is Failing To Effectively Enforce Certain Environmental
Protection Standards Regarding Agricultural Pollution Emanating from Livestock Operations
(SEM-97-003), Council Res. 00-01, CEC Doc. C/C.01/004/RES/01/Rev.03 (May 16, 2000); Comm'n
22
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Secretariat has produced seventeen factual records, with three more in
preparation. 28
The great majority of the submissions have concerned Canada or
Mexico. Forty, or exactly half of all submissions, have been filed against
Mexico, and thirty-one have been filed against Canada, including one
submission filed jointly against Canada and the United States. Only ten
submissions have been directed against the United States (including the
joint submission), and only two of those have been filed since 2000. The
last submission directed solely against the United States was made nearly
ten years ago, in 2004. 29
The distribution of factual records is similarly lopsided. Of the
seventeen completed factual records, only one concerns the United
States; the other sixteen are evenly divided between Canada and Mexico.
Of the three factual records currently in preparation, two involve Mexico
and one concerns the United States. 30
for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Mexico Is Failing To Effectively Enforce Its
Environmental Law in Relation to the Establishment and Operation of the Cytrar Hazardous Waste
Landfill, in the City of Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico (SEM-01-001), Council Res. 02-13, CEC Doc.
C/C.01/02-06/02-13/RES/Final (Dec. 10, 2002). Two other submissions were withdrawn after the
Secretariat recommended a factual record. See El Boludo Project, Registry of Submissions,
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
COMMISSION
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2378&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated July 16, 2004); Coronado Islands, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2394&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Mar. 26, 2007). And two submissions were consolidated into one. See Comm'n for Envtl.
Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Regarding the Assertion that Canada Is Failing To Effectively Enforce Section 6(a) of the Migratory
Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 (MBCA) (SEM04-006), Council Res. 05-04, CEC Doc. C/C.01/05/RES/04/Final (Apr. 1, 2005).
28
One submission was withdrawn after the Council approved a factual record. See Letter
from Devon Page, Exec. Dir., Ecojustice, to Evan Lloyd, Exec. Dir., Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation
(Jan. 17, 2011), available at www.cec.org/Storage/85/9489_06-5-NOT_en.pdf [hereinafter
Withdrawal Letter].
29
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission to the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/04-005/01/SUB (Sept. 16, 2004). In July 2013, after this Article
was written but before it went to press, the CEC received two submissions alleging that the United
States has failed to enforce the Clean Air Act against refineries in Louisiana. See Registry of
Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, supra note 26. The only other submission
received through September 2013 was one alleging that Mexico failed to follow its environmental
laws regarding the development of tourist resorts in the Gulf of California. See id.
30
See Coal-Fired Power Plants, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2390&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID=&BL_
ExpandID= (last updated Sept. 15, 2008); Ex Hacienda El Hospital II, Registry of Submissions,
COMMISSION
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2399&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
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How successful has the CEC submissions procedure been? Last
year, Professor David Markell and I analyzed the procedure according to
four factors: (a) its attractiveness to potential submitters; (b) its
“procedural justness,” which includes considerations of accessibility,
neutrality, trustworthiness, and timeliness; (c) the impact the procedure
has had on the effective enforcement of environmental laws; and (d)
whether it “has contributed to deeper or more extensive and helpful civil
engagement.” 31
We found that in some respects the procedure has a strong record. 32
For example, the procedure has consistently attracted submissions, albeit
mainly against Canada and Mexico. In comparison to other disputeresolution procedures established by NAFTA and its side agreements,
most of which have seen very little activity, the CEC submissions
procedure appears quite robust. 33
With respect to the other factors, too, the SEM process has concrete
achievements. Outside observers have consistently found the
Secretariat’s decisions on the admissibility of submissions, as well as the
factual records, to be objective and reasonable; studies have indicated
that many of the factual records have resulted in policy changes designed
to improve environmental protection; and, although hard to measure, “it
seems likely that the procedure has contributed to greater public
participation in international and domestic institutions.” 34
However, we also identified real weaknesses in the procedure. 35
Three in particular standout. First, the procedure has become very slow.
In 2001, at the recommendation of the JPAC, 36 the Council said that the
entire procedure, from filing a submission to publishing a factual record,
should ordinarily take no more than two years. 37 The earliest factual
updated Aug. 29, 2012); Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II, Registry of Submissions,
FOR
COOPERATION,
COMMISSION
ENVTL.
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2395&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Aug. 30, 2013). In August 2013, the Secretariat submitted to the Council a draft factual
record in Hermosillo II. Id.
31
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 514-17.
32
Id. at 527-29.
33
See John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 429
(2006).
34
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 524, 527, 529.
35
Id. at 520-25.
36
JOINT PUB. ADVISORY COMM., LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
(2001), available at www.cec.org/Storage/40/3253_rep11-e-final_EN.PDF [hereinafter LESSONS
LEARNED].
37
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Response to Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC)
Report on Lessons Learned Regarding the Articles 14 and 15 Process, Council Res. 01-06, CEC
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records, published before 2003, came reasonably close to that standard,
averaging less than three years each. 38 From 2003 to 2008, however, the
factual records were published an average of five years after the
submissions were filed. 39 And the procedure has become much slower in
recent years. When we conducted our study in early 2012, the three
factual records in preparation were based on submissions filed more than
seven years earlier, and one of the three had been filed nine years
previously. 40
The Council is responsible for much of the recent delay. Through
2004, the Council took an average of about five months to decide
whether to approve a Secretariat recommendation for a factual record. In
stark contrast, its decisions since 2008 have taken, on average, close to
three years, and as of 2012 two pending Secretariat recommendations
had been awaiting Council decision for four and five years,
respectively. 41 The blame cannot be placed on an increase in the number
of recommendations. From 1996 to 2004, the Council decided on sixteen
recommendations, and from 2005 to early 2012, it reviewed only five. 42
The Secretariat shares responsibility for the increased delay. The
2001 JPAC recommendation, endorsed by the Council, was that the
Secretariat take no longer than thirteen months (after Council
authorization) to prepare a draft factual record. 43 The first nine factual
records, all issued before 2004, came close to that mark, averaging less
than sixteen months. The next six, issued from 2004 to 2008, averaged
more than two years each. 44
Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev.4 (June 29, 2001).
38
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 522.
39
Id.
40
See Quebec Automobiles, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2392&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Dec. 6, 2012); Coal-Fired Power Plants, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2390&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID=&BL_
ExpandID= (last updated Sept. 15, 2008); Lake Chapala II, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2382&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Jan. 23, 2013).
41
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 522-23; see Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Article
15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record Is Warranted, CEC Doc.
A14/SEM-06-003 (May 12, 2008); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Article 15(1) Notification to
Council that Development of a Factual Record Is Warranted, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/05-003/39/ADV
(Apr. 4, 2007).
42
See Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, supra note 26.
43
LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 36, at 15.
44
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 523.
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By 2012, the process had slowed even further. The Secretariat had
three factual records in preparation in early 2012, all of which had been
approved more than three years earlier, and one of which had been
approved more than five years previously. 45 In addition, the Secretariat
was taking longer to review submissions. For most of its history, it had
taken, on average, less than five months to decide whether a submission
justified requesting a response from a party, but the submissions filed in
2010 and 2011 had taken an average of almost one year to reach that
point in the process. 46
In addition to finding major problems with timeliness, we observed
that the Council has often interfered with the Secretariat’s independent
assessment of submissions. The submissions procedure is inherently
biased toward the governments because the NAAEC gives them the right
to decide whether to authorize factual records and whether to publish
those records, 47 and the governments have acted in ways that increase
those biases. As noted, they have often put off making decisions on
Secretariat requests for factual records, so that the reports are not
finished until years after the submissions were filed. When the Council
has approved preparation of a factual record, it has often narrowed the
scope of the Secretariat recommendation, so much so that the JPAC and
other observers have complained that the utility of the report has been
undermined. 48 In December 2010, for example, the Council authorized a
45

See Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Mexico is Failing to Effectively Enforce
Articles 1, 2, 5, 18, 78, 80, 83, 88, 89, 133, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, and 170 of
the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection and 3 of its Environmental
Impact Regulations; 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 9 of the National Water Law and 2 of its Regulations; as well
as Article 44 of the Internal Regulations of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources
(SEM 03-003), Council Res. 08-01, CEC Doc. C/C.01/08/RES/01/Final (May 30, 2008); Comm'n
for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Regarding the Submission on Enforcement Matters SEM -04-005 Asserting that the
United States of America is Failing to Effectively Enforce Provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act with Regard to Mercury from Coal-Fired Power Plants, Council Res. 08-03, CEC Doc.
C/C.01/08/RES/03/Final (June 23, 2008); Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the
Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion that Canada,
and More Specifically the Province of Québec, is Failing to Effective Enforce Sections 96.1 and 96.2
of Québec’s Regulation Respecting the Quality of the Atmosphere (RQA) and Sections 10.1, 20 and
51 of the Québec Environment Quality Act (SEM-04-007), Council Res. 06-07, CEC Doc.
C/C.01/06/RES/07 (June 14, 2006).
46
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 523.
47
NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 15.
48
See Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Limiting the Scope of Factual Records and Review of
the Operation of CEC Council Resolution 00-09 Related to Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Advice to Council 03-05, CEC Doc. J/03-05/ADV/Final
(Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Advice to Council 03-05]; David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen
Submissions Process: On or Off Course?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 8, at 274; Chris Wold et
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factual record on a submission alleging failures to enforce Canadian law
on the protection of endangered species, but the Council restricted the
scope of the investigation so drastically that the submitter chose to
withdraw the submission, alleging that the Council’s limits would
“frustrate objective evaluation of Canada’s failure to enforce” its law. 49
The third problem is the lack of follow-up of factual records. A
systematic method of examining the effects of factual records would help
everyone involved, from submitters to Parties, to understand the practical
effects of the submissions procedure. It would also provide information
that could be used to strengthen the procedure, as well as to improve the
situations that led to the submissions. Despite repeated suggestions that
the CEC institute regular follow-up, however, the Council has never
adopted it. And when the JPAC announced in 2008 that it would followup factual records itself, the Council discouraged the JPAC from doing
so. 50
In our 2012 article, Professor Markell and I made a series of
recommendations aimed at improving the timeliness of the procedure,
reducing Council interference, and enhancing follow-up. With respect to
timeliness, we urged the Council to immediately authorize factual
records in two pending cases, Ex Hacienda II and Hermosillo II, both of
which had been awaiting the Council’s decision for more than four years,
and we proposed specific deadlines that the Secretariat and Council
should meet for each point in the submissions procedure. 51 If our
proposals were adopted, the process would normally take no more than
thirty months from the filing of a submission to the publication of the
factual record. We suggested that the Council remove its temptation to
narrow Secretariat recommendations by authorizing all such
recommendations in advance. 52 And, finally, we argued that the JPAC
should institute a procedure to follow-up factual records.53
We warned that if the problems are not addressed, they will
continue to erode the strengths of the submissions procedure. Indeed,
al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415 (2004).
49
Withdrawal Letter, supra note 28.
50
See Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Re: Submissions on Enforcement Matters: From
Lessons Learned to Following Up Factual Records, Advice to Council 08-01, CEC Doc. J/0801/ADV/Final (Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Advice to Council 08-01]; Letter from David McGovern,
Alternate Rep. for Can., Council of the Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, to Jane Gardner, Chair for
Joint
2008,
Pub.
Advisory
Comm.
(Aug.
14,
2008),
available
at
www.cec.org/files/PDF/ABOUTUS/Response%20to%2008-01_en.pdf.
51
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 530-35.
52
Id. at 532.
53
Id. at 537.
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they may threaten its very existence. As the procedure increasingly
comes to be seen as unfair, untimely, and ineffective, it will become less
attractive to submitters. It is probably not a coincidence that no
submissions against the United States alone have been filed since the
Coal-Fired Power Plants submission in 2004, whose factual record is
still pending more than eight years later. Environmental groups waiting
to see if that report would be meaningful enough to justify further
submissions have been waiting a very long time. There are also signs that
potential submitters interested in Canada and Mexico may be losing
interest in the SEM procedure. In 2010-2011, the CEC received a total of
seven submissions, the fewest in any two consecutive years since 19951996, the first two years of the procedure. In 2011-2012, the total
dropped even further, to five, the lowest in the history of the CEC. 54
The problems with the submissions procedure have attracted
attention from many sources, including scholars, submitters, former
Secretariat officials, and advisory bodies. 55 Perhaps most notably, the
CEC’s own JPAC has urged the Council to ensure that the procedure
meets set deadlines, 56 to refrain from limiting the scope of Secretariat
recommendations, 57 and to follow-up factual records. 58
In November 2011, the JPAC held a public meeting in El Paso,
Texas, at which those who had filed submissions with the CEC expressed
their concerns with lengthy delays, Council interference, and lack of
follow-up. 59 In connection with the meeting, the JPAC also conducted a
survey of all those who had ever filed a submission with the CEC, which
further documented their views of the procedure. The results were
strikingly negative. In the words of the JPAC:
Citizens who have taken part in SEM submissions overwhelmingly
voiced concern that the SEM process is not being administered
consistent with the spirit and intent of the NAAEC. The prevailing
54

See Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, supra note 26.
See, e.g., Randy L. Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA:
Observations After 10 Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 165 (2004); Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 24
ENVTL. F. 34 (2008); David Markell, The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen
Participation, Transparency, and Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425 (2010); Tseming
Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen Submissions
Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443 (2005).
56
LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 36.
57
Advice to Council 03-05, supra note 48.
58
Advice to Council 08-01, supra note 50.
59
Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) Regular Session 1103: Perspectives on the Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters Process and Addressing the
Cross Border Movements of Chemicals in North America, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=924&SiteNodeID=1029 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
55
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public perception is that the credibility of this valued opportunity to
contribute positively to the North American environment has been
seriously eroded, primarily because of untimely action and resistance
to full transparency and independent review by the Council and the
Parties. . . . Feedback from the El Paso forum strongly suggests that
citizens and environmental groups who have tried to put the process to
good use are finding it increasingly difficult to justify using the
process because the considerable effort required to prepare
60
submissions does not reliably lead to timely and useful information.

The JPAC agreed, stating that it “supports the public’s perspective
that the SEM process is, for the most part, unduly time-consuming and
that the Parties are insufficiently responsive to the information it
produces.” 61
III. REVISING THE GUIDELINES
During the same period that public discontent with the submissions
procedure was being expressed to the JPAC, the Council created a
working group composed of government officials, called the SEM
Modernization Task Force, to develop revisions to the Guidelines for
Submissions on Enforcement Matters (Guidelines). 62 The Guidelines
were adopted in 1999 in order to provide to potential submitters a simple,
easily understandable description of the submissions procedure. For the
most part, the Guidelines were successful at meeting that aim: in the
JPAC poll of submitters, nearly all of the respondents used the
Guidelines, and all of those who used them described them as helpful. 63
Major modifications of the Guidelines were therefore not necessary to
improve public understanding of the procedure.
Amendments could serve other purposes, however. By revising the
Guidelines, the Parties could make changes to the submissions procedure
without amending the NAAEC itself, which might require domestic
legislative approval. 64 Revisions could address the concerns raised by the
60

Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Re: Submissions on Enforcement Matters (SEM) and
Cross Border Movements of Chemicals in North America, Advice to Council 11-04, CEC Doc. J/1104/ADV/Final
(Dec.
7,
2011),
available
at
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=25148&SiteNodeID=656 [hereinafter Advice to
Council 11-04].
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE JPAC
QUESTIONNAIRE ON SUBMITTERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS UNDER
NAAEC ARTICLES 14 AND 15, available at www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10150.
64
See NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 48.
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JPAC, but they could also impair the procedure further by, for example,
placing additional restrictions on the independence of the Secretariat.
While the governmental task force was still at work, the JPAC urged it to
focus “on the timeliness and accessibility of the process, on giving more
deference to the Secretariat’s independent recommendations and
interpretations in the process, and on follow-up to factual records.”65
The task force published its proposed changes to the Guidelines in
the spring of 2012. 66 After requesting public comments on the
Guidelines, the JPAC provided advice to the Council in May of that
year, 67 as did two advisory bodies to the U.S. government. 68 After
making further changes, the Council adopted the new Guidelines in July
2012. 69
The following sections examine the changes proposed by the task
force, the comments by the JPAC and others, and the final Guidelines
adopted by the Council, in light of each of the major areas of criticism:
(a) timeliness, (b) Council interference with the procedure, and (c)
follow-up of factual records.
A.

TIMELINESS

The draft revisions to the Guidelines proposed deadlines for the
stages in the submissions procedure. 70 These additions were generally
welcomed enthusiastically by the JPAC and other commenters, 71 and the
Council adopted them with only minor changes. 72 If the deadlines are
met in the future, they will largely solve one of the major problems with
the procedure.
The following chart compares the new deadlines with three
referents: (a) the timeline recommended by the JPAC in 2001, (b) the
average times actually taken by the CEC, and (c) the recommendations
that Professor Markell and I made in our 2012 article. 73 As revised, the
new Guidelines are generally in accord with the JPAC’s 2001
recommendations and our recent suggestions. They impose a timeline of
about thirty months between the filing of a submission and the
65

Advice to Council 11-04, supra note 60.
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5.
67
Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6.
68
Joint Advisory Letter, supra note 6.
69
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
70
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5, § 19.
71
Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6, at 2.
72
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 19.
73
Knox & Markell, supra note 4.
66
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publication of a factual record. That is only slightly longer than the
JPAC’s 2001 recommendation of twenty-four months, and about the
same as our proposed schedule. 74
The chart identifies the time allotted for the following six points in
the SEM process: (1) Admissibility—the determination by the Secretariat
as to whether a submission meets the admissibility requirements in
Article 14(1) and merits requesting a response from the Party under
Article 14(2); (2) Party Response—the response by the Party concerned
to the submission; (3) Request for Factual Record (“FR”)—the
determination by the Secretariat that a factual record is warranted under
Article 15(1); (4) Council Decision—the decision by the Council as to
whether to approve the Secretariat request; (5) Draft FR—the
preparation of the draft factual record by the Secretariat; and (6)
Publication—the decision by the Council as to whether to make the final
factual record publicly available, which follows the submission of any
comments by the Parties on the draft factual record and the Secretariat’s
preparation of a final factual record. 75
The times are provided in months for convenience of comparison,
but the Guidelines actually refer to “working days.” The chart includes in
parentheses the number of working days set by the Guidelines for each
deadline, and converts the number of working days to months on the
assumption that, on average, there are twenty-one working days per
month.
CEC Submissions Procedure Timelines
[in months]
JPAC
Historical
Knox/
Average
Markell
Admissibility
Party
Response
Request for
FR
Council
Decision
Draft FR

Guidelines

2
2

5
2-3

2
2

1-2

11

8

3 (60)
1.5-3 (3060)
6 (120)

3

5 (1996-2004)
Over 24 (2004present)
16 (1996-2004)
Over 36 (2004-

3

3 (60)

12

9 (180)

13

74

Id. at 530-35. Our proposal would allow extensions for some of the deadlines if necessary,
up to a maximum of forty-one months.
75
NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 15(5)-(7).
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present)

Publication
Total

2
23–24

2 (1996-2004)
5 (2004-present)
54

2

7 (150)

29

28.5-30
(600-630)

As the chart illustrates, if the new CEC deadlines are followed, the
procedure will take about half the time of the historical average, and will
reduce even further the time the process has taken in more recent years.
Some of the new deadlines are especially valuable. For example, under
the revised Guidelines, the Council should make its decision on whether
to approve a Secretariat recommendation within sixty working days, or
about three months. 76 This would shorten the process by nearly two years
over the length of time the Council has taken since 2004 to make such
decisions.
For these reasons, the reaction of the JPAC, the U.S. advisory
committees, and other commenters on this aspect of the revisions was
generally very favorable. 77 However, there are a few points of potential
criticism. First, the revised Guidelines seem to have tacitly amended
three deadlines set by the NAAEC itself. The agreement provides that the
Parties must make any response to a submission within thirty days (or,
exceptionally, within sixty days) of receiving the request, that the Parties
may make comments on a draft factual record within forty-five days of
its submission by the Secretariat to the Council, and that after the
Secretariat incorporates such comments, as appropriate, the Council may,
by a two-thirds vote, publish the final factual record “normally within
sixty days following its submission.” 78 By not using the term “working
days,” the drafters of the NAAEC evidently intended to refer to the
normal meaning of the term “days,” that is, calendar days. The revised
Guidelines keep the references to thirty, forty-five, and sixty days,
respectively, but by treating them as working days, the effect is to
76

SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 19.4.
E.g., Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6, at 2 (“JPAC commends the proposals in
Section 19 of the Guidelines, which establish clear timeframes for each step of the process.”); Joint
Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 4 (“The NAC and GAC generally endorse the Task Force’s proposals
to speed up the SEM process and believe that, if implemented, these proposals will improve the
responsiveness of the process to citizen concerns and thereby strengthen the process.”); Letter from
Ecojustice to Joint Pub. Advisory Comm. (May 17, 2012), available at
www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10656 [hereinafter Ecojustice Letter] (“The suggested
timeframes for action by Secretariat, Parties and Council are a step in the right direction.”).
78
NAAEC, supra note 1, arts. 14(3), 15(5), (7).
77
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lengthen the set periods without going through the formal method of
amending the NAAEC.
Apart from the legal infirmity of this approach, the result is to
provide far more time than should be necessary for the draft factual
record to be finalized and published. 79 The revised Guidelines allow
about seven months (150 working days) for this stage of the process,
most of which is provided for the Parties to submit comments and for the
Council to decide whether to publish the factual record. In practice, the
Council has never decided, and never should decide, not to publish a
factual record. The Council would have done better simply to announce
that the final factual record will be published whenever the Secretariat is
finished with it.
In contrast, another of the deadlines seems too short: nine months is
probably not enough time to prepare a draft factual record. The only draft
factual record produced so quickly was the first one, prepared in 19961997, when the Secretariat still had a very small number of submissions
to review. 80 The average preparation time from 1996 to 2003, when the
Secretariat was perhaps at its most efficient, was sixteen months. 81 A
former Secretariat official who worked on factual records in this period
commented to the JPAC in 2012 that it would be more reasonable to
allow fifteen months, including twelve for preparation and three for
translation. 82 This amount of time would still be far shorter than that
taken in recent years, in which the Secretariat has taken three years or
more to complete a draft. 83
Finally, and most importantly, the revised Guidelines will improve
79

But see Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6, at 6 (“JPAC does not have a significant
concern about using working days for several of the timeframes set forth in Articles 14 and 15.”).
80
Cozumel, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2346&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID=156
(last updated Oct. 25, 1997).
81
Knox & Markell, supra note 4, at 523.
82
Comments from Katia Opalka on the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation Modernizing Submissions Enforcement Matters Process (Article 14 & 15) (Apr. 23,
2012), available at www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10625. One of the revisions to the
Guidelines now requires the Secretariat to provide factual records to the Council in all three official
languages. SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 11.4.
83
See Lake Chapala II, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2382&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Jan. 23, 2013) (Council approved May 30, 2008; Secretariat submitted draft May 28, 2012);
Montreal Technoparc, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2384&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated June 24, 2008) (Council approved Aug. 20, 2004; Secretariat submitted draft Dec. 3, 2007);
Quebec Automobiles, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2392&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Dec. 6, 2012) (Council approved June 14, 2006; Secretariat submitted draft Mar. 22, 2011).
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the timeliness of the procedure only if actually implemented. The
problems of untimeliness in recent years have been due not to the
absence of deadlines in the Guidelines, but rather to inaction by the
Council and the Secretariat. As the U.S. advisory committees stated,
“[a]mbitious timeframes may motivate improved timeliness, but
significant gaps between the timetables and actual performance are likely
to undermine confidence in the process rather than enhance it.” 84 For that
reason, they urged that the Council decide on two Secretariat requests for
factual records that had been pending before the Council for more than
four years, 85 and that the Secretariat complete three factual records based
on submissions filed more than seven years earlier. 86
B.

COUNCIL INTERFERENCE WITH SECRETARIAT INDEPENDENCE

Unfortunately, most of the changes to the Guidelines proposed by
the task force were not as helpful as those concerning timeliness. The
JPAC and the U.S. advisory committees criticized several proposals as
reducing the ability of the Secretariat to use its judgment in making the
decisions allocated to it under the NAAEC, further tilting the balance
toward the governments acting on the Council. 87 In the words of the U.S.
advisory committees, “[t]he guidelines should not create the perception
that the Council is giving more power to the Council and/or the Parties
than is clearly provided in the text of the NAAEC; or that the Council is
limiting the discretion of the Secretariat beyond the limits contained in
the NAAEC; or that the Council is limiting the value of the process to
submitters compared to the text of the Agreement.” 88
Although the final version of the Guidelines adopted by the Council
does not incorporate some of the most problematic proposals of the task
force, the revised Guidelines still include provisions that appear to give
the Parties greater control of the procedure. The following paragraphs
describe the revisions in relation to four issues: (1) restricting
admissibility of submissions, (2) allowing Parties to terminate the
process prematurely, (3) limiting the scope of factual records, and (4)
transparency.

84

Joint Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 4.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6, at 3-5; Joint Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 5-7;
Ecojustice Letter, supra note 77, at 2-3.
88
Joint Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 4.
85
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Restricting Admissibility of Submissions

As noted above, one of the criteria the NAAEC instructs the
Secretariat to consider in deciding whether to request a response from a
government to a submission is whether “private remedies available under
the Party’s law have been pursued.” 89 The task force proposed several
changes to the Guidelines that would recast this requirement as whether
private remedies have been pursued by the submitter. 90 International
complaint mechanisms do sometimes require that the submitter exhaust
domestic remedies before seeking international remedies. 91 The NAAEC
relaxes this criterion, however, by changing the requirement of
exhaustion to one of pursuit of domestic remedies, and by not requiring
that the pursuit be by the submitter. The result is to allow the Secretariat
to take into account whether remedies have been pursued by anyone. The
task force’s proposal would have tightened the requirement beyond the
text of the agreement, with the possible effect of reducing the number of
eligible submitters. For these reasons, the JPAC and other commenters
urged the Council simply to delete the added references to the
submitter. 92
In the final version of the Guidelines, the Council dropped one
reference to remedies being pursued “by the Submitter,” 93 but it retained
two other references with only slight modifications.94 The result is
confusing. The Guidelines now state that in deciding whether private
remedies have been pursued “by the Submitter and others”—language
that appears consistent with the NAAEC—the Secretariat “will be guided
by whether . . . reasonable actions have been taken by the Submitter to
pursue private remedies.” 95 It is unclear how the Secretariat will interpret
this language, although it would be on solid ground in adhering to the
language of the NAAEC itself, particularly in light of the statement in
the Guidelines that they “do not modify the Agreement and, therefore, at
89

NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(c).
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5, §§ 5.6, 7.3, 7.5.
91
E.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
92
Joint Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 5-6; see also Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6,
at 3; Ecojustice Letter, supra note 77, at 2-3; Comments of Mariana Westendarp Palacios to the
Proposed Changes to CEC’s Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters (May 17, 2012),
available at www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10658 [hereinafter Palacios Comments]; Letter
from Gustavo Alanis Ortega, Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, to Joint Pub. Aadvisory
Comm. (May 11, 2012), at 4.
93
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 7.3.
94
Id. §§ 5.6, 7.5.
95
Id. § 7.5 (emphasis added).
90
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all times, should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
Agreement.” 96
2.

Allowing Parties to Terminate the Process Prematurely

The governmental task force proposed two changes to the
Guidelines that would allow a Party to end consideration of a submission
before the Secretariat decides whether to propose a factual record. Both
proposals would expand the scope of existing defenses, or bars, to
Secretariat review of submissions, by giving the Parties more power to
invoke the defenses without having their arguments second-guessed by
the Secretariat. The JPAC, the U.S. advisory committees, and others
strongly opposed the proposals. 97 The Council adopted them both, but
only after amending their language.
The first of the two bars to Secretariat consideration of a submission
is that the NAAEC provides that if the matter raised by a submission is
the subject of a pending legal proceeding, “the Secretariat shall proceed
no further.” 98 The NAAEC limits this defense, however, by requiring the
Party concerned to notify the Secretariat of the existence of such a legal
proceeding in its response to the submission. 99 The task force proposed
changes to the Guidelines that would purport to allow the Party to raise
this affirmative defense not only in its response, but “at any point in the
submission process,” which might even be interpreted to include the
period after the Council has authorized a factual record. 100 In response to
criticisms of this proposal, the Council adopted a weaker version of it,
which states that if a Party informs the Secretariat of a pending
proceeding at any time other than in its response to the submission (as
long as the notification comes before the Council authorizes preparation
of a factual record), the Secretariat should “consider” terminating the
process. 101
The second defense is broader. Article 45(1) of the NAAEC states
that a Party has not failed to effectively enforce its environmental law
96

Id. § 18.1.
Advice to Council 12-01, supra note 6, at 3-4; Joint Advice Letter, supra note 6, at 6;
Ecojustice Letter, supra note 77, at 3; Letter from Irene Henriques, Professor of Sustainability &
Econ.,
York
Univ.,
to
Whom
It
May
Concern,
available
at
www.cec.org/Storage.asp?StorageID=10631 [hereinafter Henriques Letter]; Palacios Comments,
supra note 92, at 6.
98
NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(3)(a).
99
Id.
100
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5, § 9.5.
101
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 9.6. If the notification is made after the Council
authorizes a factual record, “the Secretariat is to proceed . . . unless Council directs otherwise.” Id.
97
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when the action or inaction in question reflects a reasonable exercise of
discretion or results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
higher environmental enforcement priorities. 102 Nothing in the NAAEC
suggests, however, that the Secretariat must accept the Party’s assertion
as necessarily correct. In practice, the Secretariat is free to consider
whether a particular failure to effectively enforce falls within the scope
of these exceptions.
The task force proposed adding a section to the Guidelines that
would cloud the Secretariat’s discretion in this respect, by stating that
“[w]hen the Party . . . informs the Secretariat in its response that its
actions do not constitute a failure to effectively enforce its environmental
laws, as provided for under Article 45(1), the Secretariat is to limit its
consideration to whether the Party has provided sufficient
information.” 103 The result of this language would appear to be that a
Party could terminate Secretariat review of submissions merely by
informing the Secretariat that the Party’s failure to effectively enforce is
excused by its decision to allocate its resources elsewhere. One
environmental group described this proposal as “the most egregious
abuse of the spirit and intent of the Citizen Submission Process in service
of the illegitimate motivations of the parties.” 104
In response to such criticisms, the Council did not reject the
proposal, but the Council did change it to preserve the Secretariat’s
discretion. As adopted, the language now states: “When the Party . . .
informs the Secretariat that its actions or inactions do not constitute a
failure to ‘effectively enforce its environmental law,’ the Secretariat is to
consider whether the Party has included sufficient information.” 105 By
itself, this language would be much less troubling than the original
proposal. But the Council left unchanged the last sentence of the
provision, which states that “[i]f the Secretariat considers that the Party
response does not provide sufficient information, the Secretariat may
determine that the submission warrants the development of a factual
record.” 106 If the “if” in that sentence is read as “if and only if,” then it
would have the same effect as the original task force proposal. To give
effect to the Council’s amendment to the proposal, however, the last
sentence should not be read so restrictively.

102

NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 45(1).
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5, § 9.7.
104
Ecojustice Letter, supra note 77, at 3.
105
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 9.5 (emphasis added).
106
Task Force Proposed Changes, supra note 5, § 9.7; SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 9.5.
103
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Limiting the Scope of Factual Records

Other proposals by the task force were directed toward cabining the
scope of factual records. One of its suggested revisions would instruct
the Secretariat “to limit its consideration [of whether to recommend a
factual record] to whether pertinent and necessary questions of fact
remain open that could be addressed in a factual record.” 107 More
explicitly, another section would state that factual records “are not to
include conclusions regarding whether a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental law or recommendations relating to future
Party or submitter action.” 108
There is no basis in the NAAEC for preventing the Secretariat from
making such recommendations, and doing so is contrary to one of the
chief purposes of the agreement: to encourage the effective enforcement
of domestic environmental laws. The possibility that a Party may be
embarrassed by a showing that it has failed to effectively enforce its
domestic law is not some undesirable by-product of the procedure; it is
how the procedure puts pressure on Parties to enforce their laws. The
submissions procedure sheds light on potential failures to effectively
enforce in order to induce better enforcement. Preventing the Secretariat
from assessing whether such failures have occurred is impossible to
reconcile with that purpose.
The task force also proposed codifying the often-criticized Council
practice of choosing for itself the scope of a factual record, rather than
voting up or down on the Secretariat’s proposal. 109 As noted above, this
practice also has no basis in the NAAEC, and it has long been the target
of criticisms from the JPAC and scholars. 110
The JPAC, the U.S. advisory committees, and other commenters
again urged the Council to delete these added provisions, 111 and here
they were more successful. Rather than state that in considering whether
to recommend a factual record, “the Secretariat is to limit its
consideration to whether pertinent and necessary questions of fact remain
open,” as the task force proposed, the Guidelines as adopted by the
Council merely state that the Secretariat “is to consider whether central
questions of fact related to the assertion(s) in the submission remain

107
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110
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open.” 112 Moreover, the Council dropped entirely the prohibition on
including conclusions regarding whether a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental law, as well as the codification of the
Council’s disputed authority to restrict the scope of factual records in
approving them. 113
4.

Transparency

Section 15.1 of the Guidelines sets out the information that the
Secretariat is required to include in the public registry, that is, the
information posted online at the CEC website. 114 The task force
proposed deleting the information that “the final factual record has been
provided to the Council.” 115 There was no good reason for this change;
without this information, the public would not be able to determine
whether the Secretariat has met the new deadline for submitting factual
records, or to judge whether delays in final publication of factual records
are the fault of the Secretariat or the Council. The JPAC and the U.S.
advisory committees opposed this proposal and urged that the registry
include notification of the provision by the Secretariat of the draft factual
record as well as the final factual record. 116 Here, too, they were
successful: the final Guidelines include both requirements. 117
C.

FOLLOWING-UP FACTUAL RECORDS

Together with the proposed revisions to the Guidelines, the task
force proposal includes a set of “Memos on Proposed Changes to the
Guidelines.” 118 Most of the memos, which seem to have been proposed
by individual governments, suggest particular changes to the Guidelines
that have already been discussed. Memorandum 18, however, entitled
“Follow-Up on Concluded Submissions,” does not make any specific
proposals. Instead, it addresses the criticisms that the CEC should do
more to follow-up factual records. Specifically, it states that each
Council member “as necessary, would provide one update” on
112
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enforcement actions on any submission that concluded at or beyond the
Party-response stage, at the first Council session two years after such
conclusion (or earlier if the Council member so chooses), and to use the
joint in camera session of the annual Council session to allow each
Council member to provide an update to the JPAC. 119
The flaws in this type of voluntary governmental self-reporting are
obvious. For the same reasons that they are not eager to authorize factual
records, governments will seek to avoid critical reviews of their
responses to factual records. Indeed, the JPAC had suggested more than
a decade earlier that governments report on their follow-up to individual
factual records, but the Council had failed to implement the
suggestion. 120 As Professor Markell and I have argued, the appropriate
CEC organ to follow-up factual records is the JPAC itself, which could
undertake an objective, transparent review of the factual record and make
appropriate recommendations to the Council and Secretariat. 121
As the organ of the CEC designed to facilitate public participation,
the JPAC has long played an active role in supervising the procedure,
including conducting workshops, undertaking reports on the procedure,
and providing advice to the Council and Secretariat. And, as noted
above, the JPAC had expressed interest in following-up factual records
in the past, but the Council had discouraged it from doing so. 122
In response to Memorandum 18, some commenters again urged the
JPAC to revisit its proposal and take on the important task of followingup factual records. In particular, the U.S. advisory committees stated:
The JPAC follow-up would be far more effective, and have much
greater credibility with the public, than the very limited, unilateral
party follow-up the Task Force proposed in Memorandum 18. . . .
[B]ecause of its status as an objective observer and its track record and
capacity to engage the public, regularized JPAC follow-up is likely to
advance the goal of building public confidence and increasing
transparency and accountability and should be included in the revised
guidelines. 123

The Council did not acknowledge these suggestions, although the
JPAC did state that “in response to the public’s comments, it will
consider the role that [it] may play in promoting the development of
119
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information regarding follow-up to factual records.” 124
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The process of revising the Guidelines for the submissions
procedure offered an opportunity for the CEC to address each of the
three major sets of problems that have bedeviled the procedure in recent
years: its long delays, its susceptibility to governmental interference, and
its failure to follow-up factual records. In the end, the revised Guidelines
are a step forward with respect to timeliness, a small step backward with
respect to Secretariat independence, and little to no movement either way
on follow-up.
The real effect of the revisions to the Guidelines will become clear
only through their implementation. In particular, the revised deadlines
will be effective only if the Council and Secretariat honor them. Here,
the early results are mixed. In June 2012, the Council finally decided to
approve the two long-standing Secretariat recommendations for factual
records in Ex Hacienda II and Hermosillo II. 125 In the following months,
the Secretariat finished, and the Council approved publication of, two of
the three factual records it had been preparing for years: Quebec
Automobiles and Lake Chapala II. 126 And the Secretariat submitted a
draft factual record for Hermosillo II to the Council in August 2013, a
little more than one year after the Council authorized it.127
On the other hand, the factual record in the Coal-Fired Power
Plants case is still in progress five years after the Council authorized it in
June 2008. 128 And the Secretariat has already failed to meet other
124
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deadlines. As of July 2012, when the Guidelines were adopted, six
submissions were pending at various stages before recommendation of a
factual record. Four of the submissions were awaiting an admissibility
decision, which under the Guidelines should take no more than sixty
working days, or about three months. 129 Even if the adoption of the
Guidelines could be considered to have reset the clock, only one of the
submissions received an admissibility decision within three months after
July 2012. 130 Another missed the deadline by two months, a third by
more than a year, and the fourth has yet to receive an admissibility
decision more than three years after it was filed. 131 The other two
submissions pending in July 2012 had already been found admissible and
had received responses from the Parties concerned, and were therefore
waiting for the Secretariat decision whether to propose a factual record.
The Guidelines now give the Secretariat about sixmonths (120 working
days) to make this determination. 132 In one of these two cases, the
Secretariat recommended a factual record in August 2013, more than a
year after the adoption of the Guidelines (and nearly three years after the
response from the Party). 133 The other case is still waiting for a
Secretariat decision. 134 This is not a promising beginning.
As this Article explains, a great deal is at stake. Despite its faults,
the CEC submissions procedure has offered a unique form of
independent review of allegedly ineffective enforcement of
129

SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 19.1.
See Sumidero Canyon II, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=25135&SiteNodeID=547&BL_ExpandID=502
(last updated Nov. 27, 2012).
131
See Protection of Polar Bears, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=25143&SiteNodeID=546&BL_ExpandID=502
(last updated Jan. 24, 2013) (found admissible in December 2012); BC Salmon Farms, Registry of
COMMISSION
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
Submissions,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=25165&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Feb. 15, 2012) (found admissible in September 2013); Alberta Tailings Ponds, Registry of
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
COMMISSION
Submissions,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2864&SiteNodeID=546&BL_ExpandID=502
(last updated Oct. 1, 2010).
132
SEM GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 19.3.
133
Wetlands in Manzanillo, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2412&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Aug. 19, 2013).
134
See Iona Wastewater Treatment, Registry of Submissions, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2876&SiteNodeID=250&BL_ExpandID= (last
updated Feb. 14, 2012).
130

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/6

26

Knox: Fixing the CEC Submissions Procedure

2013]

FIXING THE CEC SUBMISSIONS PROCEDURE

107

environmental laws. By continuing to bring complaints to the procedure,
individuals and groups have repeatedly demonstrated that they regard it
as valuable. It is therefore deeply troubling that the procedure’s recent
dysfunctions seem to have discouraged potential submitters from using
it.
To restore their faith in the submissions procedure, more is
necessary than the adoption of Guidelines promising shorter deadlines.
The Council and the Secretariat will have to meet the new deadlines in
practice, the Council will have to refrain from micro-managing the
Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee will probably have
to take on the difficult but crucial task of following-up factual records.
Otherwise, the problems that have plagued the adolescence of the
submissions procedure seem likely to persist into its third decade.
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